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RECENT CASES
find themselves in the position of losing the goods they strenu-
ously endeavored to acquire. We must recognize that these people
are often unaware of their rights, and lack the means to insure
that they are protected. Yet, if the creditor's remedies are exces-




SUBDIVISIONS LIABLE FOR NON-DISCRETIONARY TORTIOUS CONDUCT.
Plaintiff brought an action against the Minot Park District for
the death of her twelve year old son who drowned in an unfenced,
unguarded duck pond. The trial court granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment on the basis of governmental immunity. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed and held that
the immunity afforded local governmental entities from tort lia-
bility would no longer be retained. Therefore, political subdivisions
could be, within certain limits, liable for negligence.1 Kitto v. Mi-
not Park District, 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974).
Governmental immunity is the protection from liability for tort-
ious conduct afforded local governmental units. 2 Generally, it is
agreed that the doctrine originated in a 1788 Kings Bench decision,
Russell v. Men of Devon.3 Subsequently, the doctrine in Russell
was adopted in the United States,4 and the concept of governmen-
tal immunity -became the general rule in this country.5 Although
immunity previously was a convenient alternative to imposing bur-
densome judgments on budding municipalities,6 this fact does not
1. Judge Johnson, speaking for a unanimous bench, wrote the opinion of the court.
2. Governmental immunity, then, should be distinguished from the concept of sover-
eign immunity which is the immunity possessed by the state government. It might be
more appropriate to term the concept state immunity since sovereignty has other connota-
tions in that sovereignty Inheres in the people. See State ex. rel. Miller v. Taylor, 22 N.D.
362, 133 N.W. 1046 (1911).
3. 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). This case, involving a tort action against an
unincorporated county, established immunity from liability on two grounds. First, there
was no fund out of which a judgment could be satisfied. Secondly, the court thought it
better that an individual sustain a loss rather than the public suffer an inconvenience.
4. Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812) Mower was dissimilar, how-
ever, since unlike Russell It involved a county that was incorporated, could sue and be
sued, and had a corporate fund out of which a judgment could be satisfied. Thus, the doc-
trine was adopted but the reasoning was not.
5. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 970-87 (4th ed. 1971).
6. See Vail v. Town of Armenia, 4 N.D. 299, 59 N.W. 1092 (1894). For example, In
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explain the doctrine's continued existence. Where legislatures have
acted in this area, the effect has been to create exceptions rather
than rules. 7 As a consequence, courts have been compelled to di-
minish the harshness of the concept by striking down illogical and
unjust distinctions created by the exceptions." With Kitto, North
Dakota joined the steadily increasing number of jurisdictions that
have abrogated governmental immunity.9
In the past, however, local governmental units have not en-
Vail, the first case in which governmental immunity was applied in North Dakota, the
court observed:
One judgment against the town in a case of the character and seriousness
disclosed in the complaint in this case would involve the town in financial
distress from which it could not be extricated for years, and would greatly
retard its further settlement and progress.
Id. at 1095.
7. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE 40-43-07 (1960). This statute provides what is commonly
called the insurance waiver theory, whereby political subdivisions are deemed to have
waived their immunity to the extent of liability insurance purchased. It should be noted
that the park district in Kitto did not carry any insurance.
8. As one court has stated:
The rule of governmental immunity for tort is an anachronism, without ra-
tional basis, and has existed only for the force inertia . . . [It is] riddled
with exceptions, . . . and the exceptions operate so illogically as to cause
serious inequality. Some injured by the government can recover and others
cannot . . .
Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 216, 359 P.2d 457, 460, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89,
92 (1961).
9. Jurisdictions which have judicially abrogated governmental immunity include: Dis-
trict of Columbia, Spencer v. General Hosp. of Dist. of Columbia, 425 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir.
1969) ; Alaska, City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alas. 1962); Arizona, Veach
v. City of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 195, 427 P.2d 335 (1967); California, Muskopf v. Corning
Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Colorado, Evans v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 197, 482 P.2d 968 (1971) ; Florida, Hargrove v. Town
of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) ; Idaho, Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d
937 (1970) (governmental and proprietary distinction retained) ; Illinois, Moliter v. Kane-
land Union Community Dist. No. 302, 18 11. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) ; Indiana, Camp-
bell v. State, 284 N.E.2d 733 (Ind. 1972); Kentucky, Haney v. City of Lexington, 386
S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964) ; Louisiana, Hamilton v. City of Shreveport, 247 La. 784, 174 So. 2d
529 (1965); Board of Commrs v. Splendour Shipping and Enterprises, -LLa.- , 273
So. 2d 19 (1973); Michigan, Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1
(1961) ; Minnesota, Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d
795 (1962) Nebraska, Johnson v. Municipal Univ. of Omaha, 184 Neb. 512, 169 N.W.2d
286 (1969) Nevada, Rice v. Clark County, 79 Nev. 253, 382 P.2d 605 (1963) ; New Jer-
sey, Willis. Department of Conserv. & Econ. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970) ; Penn-
sylvania, Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973);
Rhode Island, Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 562, 261 A.2d 896 (1970); Wisconsin, Holytz
v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
Legislative action abolishing governmental immunity is as follows: HAWAII REV.
STAT. (Supp. 1974) ; IOWA CODE ANN. ch. 25A (Supp. 1974) ; In New York, statute con-
strued to abolish in Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, ch. 41 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 80.260-300 (1974)
UTAH CODE ANN. ch. 30 (Supp. 1973).
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A, at 12-20 (Tent. Draft, No. 19, 1973)
has classified the following jurisdictions as maintaining the insurance waiver theory (note:
Because of the Kitto decision, North Dakota has been omitted) : Georgia, 122 Ga. App.
665, 178 S.E.2d 557 (1970); Kansas, 196 Kan. 148, 410 P.2d 347 (1966); Mississippi, 227
So. 2d 475 (Miss. 1969). See also Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 21-37-37, 21-21-11, 21-25-11, 41-18-11
(1972) ; Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 71.185 (Supp. 1972) ; some minor statutes in Montana,
e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 11-1305, 11-1503 (1968) New Hampshire, Gossler v. City
of Manchester, 107 N.H. 310, 221 A.2d 242 (1966); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
5-6-18 to -22 (1966); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1972); Ohio, OIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.83 (Page, Supp. 1972); Tennessee, Ballew v. City of Chattanooga,
205 Tenn. 289, 326 S.W.2d 466 (1959) ; Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, §§ 5601 et seq.
(Supp. 1972), tit. 29, §§ 1401, 1403 (1970) ; West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-12-7
(1969) authorizes insurance but does not affect liability; Cunningham v. County Court, 148
V. Va. 303, 134 S.E.2d 725 (1964) ; Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 15.1-4 (1965).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A at 12-20 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973)
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joyed total immunity. In North Dakota, municipal corporations have
long been held liable for failure to keep streets and sidewalks in
a reasonably safe condition.10 This function has, for one reason
or another, been regarded as proprietary.1  The effect of such
classification is to create a sphere in which governmental immun-
ity is not applicable. The theory seems to be that a city is a
corporate body which, when it acts in the interest of a special
group, performs functions similar to that of a private corporation
and, therefore, should be subject to the same liability in tort.
12
However, when the subdivision engages in activities that benefit
all people in the community, it acts in its governmental, as op-
posed to its corporate, capacity and is immune from suit. 13 In
Kitto, the court declared that this distinction would no longer be
maintained in North Dakota for governmental units other than the
state.
4
The doctrine of governmental immunity, is a concept which re-
cognizes several other exceptions besides liability for proprietary
functions. It has been acknowledged that there is no immunity for
the maintenance of a public nuisance.' 5 Moreover, a local govern-
has classified the following jurisdictions as adhering to the traditional common law posi-
tion. (Note: Because of a recent decision, Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa.
584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973), Pennsylvania abrogated governmental immunity and therefore
has been omitted) : Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 502 (1959) ; Arkansas, judicially abol-
ished in Parish v. Pitts 244 Ark. 1289, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968) (restored by ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2901 (Supp. 1971) ; Delaware, Wilmington Housing Auth. v. Williamson, 228
A.2d 782 (Del. 1967); Maryland; Massachusetts; South Dakota, Conway v. Humbert, E2
S.D. 317, 143 N.W.2d 524 (1966) ; Virginia, Kellam v. School Bd., 202 Va. 252, 117 S.E.2d
96 (1960).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A at 12-20 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973)
has classified the following jurisdictions as maintaining a modified approach to govern-
mental Immunity: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 7-465 (Noncum. Supp. 1971)
South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2621 et seq. (Supp. 1971), 47-70, 47-379 (1962)
Texas, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (1970).
10. Larson v. City of Grand Forks, 3 Dak. 307, 19 N.W. 414 (1884) ; Ludlow v. City of
Fargo, 3 N.D. 485, 57 N.W. 506 (1893). More recently, Maloney v. City of Grand Forks,
15 N.W.2d 769 (N.D. 1944).
For the claims procedure against municipal corporations for injury from defective
sidewalks, streets and bridges, see N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 40-42-01 to -03 (1960).
11. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 982.
12. S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, STkTE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 1103 (1970).
13. See Montain v. City of Fargo, 38 N.D. 432, 166 N.W. 416 (1917). A municipally
owned and operated public utility plant is a classic example of a proprietary function,
while police protection is typically regarded as governmental in nature. W. PROSSER, supra
note 5, at 979-81.
14. The court overruled what seemed to be a well established principle of governmental
immunity in North Dakota. Previously, the court had been quite emphatic when called
upon to consider the question. As recently as 1965, in a suit against the same park dis-
trict that was involved in Kitto, the court commented:
The courts cannot legislate regardless of how much we might desire to do
so. Therefore, regardless of how worthy a claim agaist a municipal corpora-
tion might be, we cannot assume the functions of the Legislative Assembly.
Our power is limited to passing on laws enacted by the Legislature, and
if the Legislature fails to act, we cannot change the law by judicial decision.
Fetzer v. Minot Park Dist., 138 N.W.2d 601, 604 (N.D. 1965). The court reiterated lts
sentiments later: "If it is desirable to change this rule of (governmental immunity],
which is well settled in this State, the request for change should be addressed to the
Legislative Assembly." Kaczor v. City of Minot, 138 N.W.2d 784, 785 (N.D. 1965).
15. Moulton v. City of Fargo, 39 N.D. 502, 167 N.W. 717, 719 (1918).
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mental unit has not been found immune from liability for proper-
ty damage.' 6 A further limitation on the scope of governmental
immunity as applied in North Dakota involved the insurance wai-
ver. A political subdivision was deemed to have waived its im-
unity to the extent that it carried liability insurance. 17 The court
in Kitto acknowledged this trend of restriction of the doctrine and
took the final step consummating its abrogation. This overturn of
governmental immunity seems to be consistent with the abolition
or nonrecognition of similar concepts in the state.'
Although the doctrine of governmental immunity was abolished
as it existed, the court conceded that there were limits as to what
would constitute actionable negligence. Counties, townships, park
districts, school districts and other units of local government are
now liable in tort in all but their discretionary functions.19 Al-
though discretionary activity cannot be described by specific rules,
it does involve an evaluation of several competing factors. 20 Chief
among these considerations is the extent to which the threat of
liability to government officers would impair their decision-making
when confronted with valid alternatives. 2' When acting in its ad-
ministrative capacity in executing policy decisions, the government
16. Donaldson v. City of Bismarck, 3 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1942); Thorson v. City of
Minot, 153 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 1967).
17. Shermoen v. Lindsey, 163 N.W.2d 738 (N.D. 1968). The future of governmental
Immunity was foreshadowed when the court acknowledged that:
We are inclined to agree that It is manifestly unfair that an Innocent victim
of tort should be without recourse when the tort is perpetuated by a govern-
mental agency, employee or agents. Although inroads have been piece-meal
[such Inroads] have resulted in diminishing the consequences of this doctrine.
Id. at 743.
18. Both charitable immunity, Graiger v. Deaconess Hosp., 138 N.W.2d 443 (N.D. 1965),
and intra family immunity, Nuell v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967), have been looked
upon disfavorably by North Dakota courts.
19. As the Court in Kitto stated: "The exercise of discretion carries with it the right to
be wrong. It is for torts committed in the execution of the activity decided upon that lia-
bility attaches, not for the decision Itself." Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 804
(N.D. 1974).
20. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973) described the fac-
tors that will determine a discretionary function and its consequences:
(1) The nature and importance of the function which the officer is performing.
(2) The extent to which passing judgment on the exercise of discretion by
the officer will amount necessarily to passing judgment by the court on the
conduct of a coordinate branch of government.
(3) The extent to which the imposition of liability would impair the free
exercise of his discretion by the officer.
(4) The extent to which the ultimate financial responsibility will fall on the
officer.
(5) The likelihood that harm will result to members of the public if action
is taken.
(6) The nature and seriousness of the type of harm which may be produced.
(7) The availability to the Injured party of other remedies and other forms
of relief.
Id. § 895D, comment f at 43-44.
21. See Lipman v. Brishane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 229, 359 P.2d 465,
467, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1961). In this case the court determined that even when an act
was dishonest, it was better to let the injury go unredressed than to subject honest offi-
cials to constant fear of retaliation.
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and its agents must not be subject to second-guessing by the
courts .2
Acts which traditionally have been regarded as legislative,23
quasi-legislative, judicial 24 or quasi-judicial 2 5 are yet immune from
private redress and unaffected by Kitto. In fact, it may be found
that even if the discretionary act performed is dishonest or mali-
cious, no liability attaches so long as the officer is within the scope
of his authority. 26 Discretionary immunity is not completely with-
out limitations, however. If there is a special duty running to a
particular individual, liability may be imposed. 2T Also, the exercise
of discretion is limited by a superior right guaranteeing every per-
son immunity from invasion of his private rights without due pro-
cess of law. 28  While neither total immunity nor absolute liability
in governmental tort is desirable, 29 Kitto offers a welcome alter-
native.
The court was confronted with several options in Kitto. Be-
sides deciding as they did or reaffirming prior decisions,30 the court
could have decided the case on the basis of N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 40-49-04, which authorizes 'that park districts can "sue and be
sued." Evidently, the purpose of the statute is to insure against
the usurpation of a park district's governmental powers.3 1 However,
some courts have construed identical language to constitute a waiv-
22. The following are examples of activities that have been construed to be either dis-
cretionary or ministerial subsequent to abrogation of governmental immunity. A city was
not immune from liability for injury sustained by a bystander when a police officer shot
at a burglary suspect. Laughlin v. City of Pittsburg, 226 Pa. Super. 431, 310 A.2d 289
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1973) ; No liability for injury to child since teacher's decision to leave the
classroom was discretionary. Miller v. Grelsel, 297 NE.3d 463 (Ind. App. 1973).
23. This legislative immunity is applicable at least where the activity entertained is
legitimate. See Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 889
U.S. 802 (1967).
24. Judicial immunity is based on considerations of public policy and is applied
even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly. Judges
must be at liberty to exercise their functions independently and without fear
of consequences. See Landseidel v. Culeman, 47 N.D. 275, 181 N.W. 593
(1921).
25. Corrao v. Mortier, 7 Wis. 2d 494, 96 N.W.2d 851 (1959) (power to grant permit
or license) ; Silver v. Dickson, 403 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1968) (parole board members) ; But
ef. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968) (parole officer).
26. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 580 (2d Cir. 1949).
27. There seems to be no duty for a city to provide police protection on request. Silver
v. City of Minneapolis, 284 Minn. 266, 170 N.W.2d 206 (1969). However, a duty may be
found when police authorities undertake responsibilities to particular members of the pub-
lic and expose them without adequate protection to risks which turn into losses. Schuster
v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
28. See Neer v. State Live Stock Sanitary Bd., 40 N.D. 340, 168 N.Y. 601 (1918). It
was therein determined that property declared to be a nuisance through discretion of the
sanitary board could be destroyed without a hearing so long as an action for damages re-
mained In the event the determination was erroneous.
29. Absolute liability was actually suggested in a case holding a municipality liable for
tort. Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919). (concurring opin-
ion). On the other hand at one time in South Carolina, total Immunity was the rule except
where liability was provided for by statute. Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72
S.E. 228 (1911).
30. Fetzer v. Minot Park Dist., 138 N.W.2d 601 (N.D. 1965) ; KaCzor v. City of Minot,
138 N.W.2d 784 (N.D. 1965).
31. When a park district is located within a city, the city will be estopped from exer-
890 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
er of immunity.12 Seemingly, the court could have resolved Kitto
on this basis, but instead it found that the statute only provided
evidence of legislative intent to restrict rather than sustain govern-
mental immunity3
Another alternative to Kitto would have been to abrogate both
governmental and sovereign immunity34 However, the court felt
that although governmental immunity was a judicial doctrine, so-
vereign immunity was mandated in N.D. Const. art. 1, § 22.5 To
bolster the perception that § 22 applied only to the state, the
court relied on other powers spelled out in the Constitution that
deliniated between the state government itself and its political sub-
divisions . 6 Therefore, it concluded that the word "state" in § 22
was to be given its literal meaning.3 7
In light of Kitto, it has now been recognized that a person in-
jured by the negligence of a local governmental unit may pursue
compensation through our judicial system. On the other hand, an
individual similarly 'injured through the negligence of the state gov-
ernment is precluded from seeking recompense. This distinction
seems unreasonable in view of the fact that sovereign immunity
is every bit as harsh and unfair as governmental immunity. 8
When confronted with a similar situation in Muskopf v. Corning
cising powers which are substantially within the park district's province. See City of
Fargo v. Geary, 33 N.D. 64, 156 N.W. 552 (1916).
32. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Knowles v.
Housing Authority, 212 Ga. 729, 95 S.E.2d 659 (1956).
33. 224 N.W.2d 795, 802 (N.D. 1974). Had the court found that such language consti-
tuted a waiver of immunity, another exception would have been created in the chaotic
field of governmental immunity. It seems the court preferred to meet the issue directly
instead of engaging in any evasive tactics. See generally Peck, The Role of the Courts
and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MiNN. L. REV. 265 (1963) ; Van Alstyne,
Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REV.
163 (1963),
34. While the doctrine of governmental immunity seems to have originated in Russcll,
the concept of sovereign immunity may have stemmed from the ancient maxim that "the
King can do no wrong." In reference to this, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court commented: "How it became in the United States the basis for a rule that the
federal and state governments did not have to answer for their torts has been called 'one
of the mysteries of legal evolution'." Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,
214-15, 359 P.2d .157, 458-59, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90-91 (1961) quoting Borchard, Governmental
Responsibility in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1924). It has been suggested that the precarious
financial condition of the colonies subsequent to the Revolutionary War had an effect on
the adoption of sovereign immunity. Gellborn & Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal
Government, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 722 (1947).
35. N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 22 (hereinafter referred to as § 22) provides as follows :
All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due process of law, and
right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be
brought against the state in such manner, in such courts, and in such cases,
as the legislative assembly may, by law, direct.
(Emphasis added).
36. See N.D. CONST. art. 10, §§ 182, 183, 184, 187 ; N.D. CONST. art. 2, § 69.
37. Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 801 (N.D. 1974).
38. The court seemed to acknowledge the injustice of sovereign immunity, but, feeling
restrained by § 22, deferred the problem to the legislature. Id. at 804. It has been suggested
that one of the most recurring reasons for the slow demise of the doctrines of govern-
mental and sovereign immunity is deference to the legislature. See 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 872
(1974).
RECENT CASES' 891
Hospital District,"5 the California Supreme Court abrogated both
doctrines. It is interesting to note that Muskopf involved the inter-
pretation of a constitutional provision comparable to § 22.40 Jus-
tice Traynor remarked that if the clause had any substantive signi-
ficance at all, it would appear to, be a waiver of immunity rather
than a mandate.
41
Sovereign immunity is a common law concept that seems to
have been given a constitutional basis. When the provision is ex-
plicit,4- it is incontrovertible that the doctrine is rooted in the con-
stitution and, thus, there can be no question as to the intention
of the framers. The language of the North Dakota Constitution
contained in § 22, however, would appear to be neutral in this
respect.4 3 The basis that sovereign immunity is grounded in the
constitution is actually a judicial construction.4 4 In fact, it is ex-
tremely peculiar that the drafters of the North Dakota Constitu-
tion would have inserted such a particularly burdensome clause
within the Declaration of Rights.45 Arguably, the court could have
taken a different approach in Kitto and abolished both governmen-
tal and sovereign immunity.
4 6
Most judicial action concerning governmental immunity has been
followed by legislative reaction. Following judicial abrogation in
other jurisdictions, governmental immunity has been restored, '4 7 par-
tially restored, 4  or comprehensive torts schemes have been en-
acted.49 Recently, however, these tort schemes have been vulner-
39. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
40. CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 6 (1849) provided: "Suits may be brought against the state
in such manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law."
41. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 217, 359 P.2d 457, 460-61, 11 Cal
Rptr. 89, 92-93 (1961). Recently, other jurisdictions have found that the constitutional
provisions regarding sovereign immunity are not insurmountable. Perkins v. State, 252 Ind.
549, 251 N.E.2d 30 (1969): Campbell v. State, 284 N.E.2d 733 (Ind. 1972) ; Bd. of Comm'rs.
v. Splendour Shipping and Enterprises, - La.- , 273 So. 2d 19 (1973). Contra, Brown v.
Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d 868 (1973).
42. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 14 reads as follows: "That the State of Alabama shall
never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity."
43. The pertinent clause in § 22 reading as follows: "Suits may be brought against the
state In such manner, in such courts, and in such cases, as the legislative assembly may,
by law, direct." N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
44. See Wirtz v. Nestos, 51 N.D. 603, 200 N.W. 524 (1924); Spielman v. State, 91
N.W.2d 627 (N.D. 1958).
45. N.D. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1-24. Enumerated within the Declaration of Rights are the
inalienable rights of free speech, association, speedy trial and other guarantees. To find
that sovereign immunity is mandated within this section is to Ignore the surroundings In
which the clause is found. In other words, as it is now interpreted, § 22 is a "thorn
amongst the roses."
46. Certainly it would have been a valid alternative to interpret § 22 as only an acknow-
ledgement of procedural regulation of the people's substantive rights against the state and
a mere qualification of the immediately preceding clause. See N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
47. Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968) (followed by ARK. STAT. ANN.
,512-2901 to 2903 (Supp. 1973)).
48. E.g., Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1961) (fol-
lowed by COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-10-101 et seq. (Supp. 1973)).
49. E.g., Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89 (1961), followed by CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 810-996.6 (\Vest Supp. 1974)).
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able to equal protection attacks.5 0 If the North Dakota Legislature
acts in response to Kitto, this should be taken into consideration.5 1
In the formulation of rules and exceptions, it must be remem-
bered that when we speak of negligence, liability is the rule and
immunity is the exception. Yet, it somehow developed in this coun-
try that for governmental tort, immunity was the rule and liabil-
ity was the exception. Whether such a concept evolved out of the
misinterpretation of an ancient English maxim or as a consequence
of struggling municipalities and colonies that wanted to evade bur-
densome judgments, the justifications for the application of the doc-
trines of governmental and sovereign immunity no longer exist.
State and local governments have greatly matured, both financial-
ly and structurally, since early days of settlement and stand in a
unique position to spread losses which have, historically, fallen upon
lone individuals. With Kitto, these developments were acknowledged
and governmental immunity has been abrogated in North Dakota.
However, the matter of sovereign immunity was deferred to the
legislature. If the legislature fails to act, the court should recon-
sider the questionable mandate of the doctrine and, hopefully, the
substantive rights of all injured tort victims will soon be recog-
nized.
DARROLD E. PERSSON
50. Reich v. State Highway Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972); Turner v.
Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (1973). These tort schemes set up procedural technicali-
ties that do not exist for the non-governmental tort victim. In Reich the court found that
a 60-day notice of claim provision for bringing a cause of action against the government
was a violation of equal protection since it set up a special statute of limitations different
from that affecting the private tort feasor. These notice provisions arbitrarily divide tort
feasors into two classes: (1) private tort feasors to whom no notice of claim is owed, and
(2) governmental tort feasors to whom notice is owed.
51. At the time of this writing there is a proposal in the North Dakota Legislature con-
cerning tort liability for political subdivisions, HB 1541. The bill, however, expressly ex-
cludes any application affecting sovereign immunity and, moveover, sets up separate claim
requirements that would severely limit the rights of the governmental tort victim. It
should be noted that the 90-day notice of claim requirement for injuries arising from de-
fective streets and sidewalks has been upheld in North Dakota. Aune v. City of Mandan,
167 N.W.2d 754 (N.D' 1969).
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